Security
Continuo holds information you can't afford to lose and can't afford to leak. Here's how we think about that — what's protecting you, what isn't, and what we're honest about not having yet.
The short version
Your secret is encrypted on your device before it leaves your browser. We don't have the key. We can't read it. We can't reset it for you. If our database were stolen tomorrow, the attacker would get ciphertext, not plaintext.
Everything below explains how that works — and what we don't promise. We think honesty about our limits is as important as the cryptography that protects you.
The four primitives
Every secret Continuo holds is protected by the same four cryptographic primitives, used in sequence, with no shortcuts.
Argon2id — your master password never leaves your browser
When you sign up, your master password is stretched into a
256-bit key-encryption key (KEK) using Argon2id with the
parameters time=3, memory=64 MiB, parallelism=4.
That's roughly a third of a second of work on a modern laptop
— fast enough to feel instant, slow enough that a brute-force
attacker has to do real work for every guess.
The KEK wraps your per-user data-encryption key (DEK). The wrapped DEK is the only thing we store. The KEK itself is non-extractable inside your browser — it can't be read out by JavaScript, by a browser extension, or by us.
When you log in, your browser re-runs Argon2id with the same parameters and the result has to match. We never see the password; we see the result of the comparison. If the result is wrong, we reject the login.
X25519 sealed boxes — your recipients hold the only keys
When you add a recipient, they generate an X25519 key pair in their own browser. Their private key never leaves their device. Your secret is sealed to their public key using X25519 + XSalsa20-Poly1305 — a sealed-box construction that even Continuo can't open without their private key.
When the release fires, we send the recipient a wrapped copy of their own private key (protected by a passphrase they chose at signup), plus the sealed-box payload. Their browser unwraps the private key, opens the sealed box, and reveals the secret. The server has participated in none of those steps.
AES-GCM-256 at rest — your DEK encrypts everything you save
Once you're signed in, every secret you create is encrypted in your browser with your DEK using AES-256-GCM with a fresh random nonce. The ciphertext (plus nonce and authentication tag) is what we store. We have the DEK wrapped, but we can't unwrap the DEK without your master password, which we never have.
TLS 1.3 in transit — no plaintext on the wire
Every byte between your browser and our servers is encrypted in transit with TLS 1.3. We publish HSTS headers so your browser refuses to downgrade to HTTP. There is no plaintext path on the network — neither for your master password, nor for your DEK, nor for any secret value.
What happens if our database is breached
This is the question we get asked most often, and it's the right one to ask. Here's the layered answer:
An attacker with our database gets: email addresses, Argon2id verifier hashes, wrapped DEKs, ciphertext blobs, recipient email addresses and public keys, audit log metadata, and timestamps.
An attacker with our database does not get: any master password, any per-user DEK in unwrapped form, any plaintext secret, any recipient private key.
To turn an Argon2id verifier into a working decryption capability, an attacker would have to brute-force your master password (slow, because of Argon2id), derive the KEK from the cracked password (one-time work), unwrap the DEK (instant once the KEK is known), and then decrypt the ciphertext (instant). The first step is the bottleneck. A strong master password that you've never reused anywhere else makes this attack impractical.
This is not a "military-grade encryption" claim. It's the documented behaviour of the four primitives above, with the specific parameters we use. The verification is in the public tests that prove the round-trip works.
What happens if you lose your master password
We can't reset it. We can't recover it. We can't bypass it. This is by design — the same property that keeps an attacker from resetting your password is what keeps us from doing it either.
Practically, that means: if you lose your master password and you haven't written it down somewhere, your encrypted secrets stay on our servers but become permanently unreadable. You can still sign in (you don't need the password to manage metadata), but you can't decrypt anything.
We surface this prominently in the signup flow and in the FAQ on the home page. Treat your master password like a hardware-wallet seed phrase: write it down, keep one copy in a safe, keep a second copy in a different safe, and use a password manager for the day-to-day copy.
The Certificate of Release
Every release Continuo issues generates a Certificate of Release: a JSON envelope containing the recipient, the secret label, the timestamp, the cryptographic fingerprints, and an Ed25519 signature from our published signing key.
The certificate is downloadable as both JSON and PDF. Anyone
— a lawyer, an executor, a family member, a court — can
verify it independently at
/verify using the public
key published at
https://dev.continuo.co.za/.well-known/continuo-signing-key.pem.
They don't need a Continuo account and they don't need to
trust us.
This is the closest thing Continuo ships to a "trust anchor." The certificate is tamper-evident (any modification breaks the signature), timestamped (the signed payload includes the issuance time), and portable (the JSON is self-contained, with no proprietary viewer needed).
What the certificate is not: it does not prove you died. It only proves Continuo issued a release envelope at a specific time. The meaning of that envelope — whether it was warranted, premature, or fraudulent — is a question for people, not cryptography.
How we run the service
The cryptography above is necessary but not sufficient. The service that runs it has to be defended too. Here's the operational picture:
Network defences
- Cloudflare sits in front of every request. TLS termination, DDoS mitigation, bot filtering, and WAF rules are handled at the edge.
- BunkerWeb runs on each application box as a reverse proxy with OWASP Core Rule Set paranoia-level 2 and per-route rate limits.
- Separate signing-key subdomain — our Ed25519 signing key is served only from
keys.continuo.co.za, which serves nothing else and drops all other traffic.
Database and storage
- Encrypted backups — Postgres base backups and continuous WAL archives go to Backblaze B2, encrypted at rest, with 30-day object lock to prevent tampering.
- Hot standby — a streaming-replication replica in a second box, with
pg_auto_failoverpromoting the replica within seconds if the primary dies. - Sealed networking — no public Postgres port. The app talks to the database over localhost; replicas talk over a private DC network.
Data residency
- South Africa — production runs in the Cape Town data centre today, with a Joburg failover planned. All data stays in-region. POPIA data-residency requirements are met.
- Resend for transactional email — Resend receives the recipient's email address and the message body, but never receives any secret contents. Sub-processor list available on request.
First responders (Phase 10 — when shipped)
The four primitives above protect the data. A separate feature, currently in planning, protects the timing.
First responders are people you designate on your account who can intervene at the moment the release countdown opens. They can confirm "Owner is alive" (which extends your check-in clock by 30 days), confirm "Owner is deceased" (which fires the release immediately), or fall through to the normal release flow by remaining silent.
First responders generate their own key pair in their browser — the same X25519 model as recipients, with the server holding only the public key. Every action they take is cryptographically signed and logged to the audit trail. You can revoke a first responder at any time, with a 24-hour delay to prevent a compromised account from immediately locking them out.
This is the industry-standard answer to the false-positive release problem — when you're alive but incapacitated (hospitalised, in a refugee camp, on a silent-area trip) and unable to check in, a person you trust can hold the release for you. See the privacy policy and terms for the full authority model when the feature ships.
What we don't have — and what we're working toward
We're a small team. We take security seriously, but we can't match the incident-response capacity of a bank. The trade-off — and the reason we think the trade-off is acceptable — is that the blast radius of any incident is bounded by what's in our database, and what's in our database is, by design, not your plaintext.
What we don't have yet
- No third-party security audit. We have a comprehensive test suite, and the cryptography has been reviewed by independent engineers, but we don't claim to have had the rigorous audit a bank or large SaaS has. We plan to commission a full audit before our first paid tier launch.
- No SOC 2 Type 1. Compliance certification is a year-2 goal. We track POPIA and will track SOC 2 when the operation is at the scale that makes the certification proportionate.
- No bug-bounty programme. We don't run a paid bounty programme today. We do publish a security contact and respond to good-faith reports (see below).
- No 24/7 security operations centre. We're a small team. Response to security incidents happens in South African business hours, with escalation paths documented for after-hours events.
- No hash-chained audit log. Our audit log is append-only at the database level but is not cryptographically chained. The Certificate of Release is signed and tamper-evident — that gives you verifiable proof of every release event — but the broader audit log (logins, settings changes, recipient additions) can be modified by anyone with database write access. Closing this gap is on the roadmap.
What we do promise
- Honest disclosure of incidents. If we have a security incident that affects your data, we'll email you within 72 hours of confirmation, with what we know, what's affected, and what we're doing about it.
- Documented security contact. security@continuo.co.za reaches a real human who reads security reports.
- Sub-processor list on request. Ask at privacy@continuo.co.za and we'll send you the current list of third parties who handle any of your data.
- Continued investment in the cryptography. Argon2id, X25519, Ed25519, AES-GCM-256, and TLS 1.3 are not marketing choices — they're the right primitives today. As the standards evolve, we'll evolve with them.
Security disclosure policy
We welcome reports from security researchers and from attentive users who notice something odd. Here's how we handle them.
How to reach us: email security@continuo.co.za. Encrypt your report if you can — we'll publish a PGP key for this address shortly. If you don't have PGP, plain text is fine for low-severity observations; please don't put credentials, exploit payloads, or full reproducible steps in plain-text email.
What we'll do: acknowledge your report within 2 business days, triage it within 5 business days, and keep you informed of progress if the fix takes longer than that. We won't take legal action against good-faith research that respects the disclosure window below.
The disclosure window: please give us 90 days from confirmation before public disclosure. If we're actively fixing the issue and need more time, we'll tell you; if we're not making progress, you can publish earlier.
What we ask you not to do: don't access other users' data, don't degrade the service for other users, don't exfiltrate data beyond what's necessary to demonstrate the issue, and don't post the report to social media or journalists before we've had a chance to fix it.
Recognition: we don't run a paid bounty programme today. When we do, prior reporters who respected this policy will be the first we invite. For now, recognition is on the about page with your permission.
Contact
Security disclosures: security@continuo.co.za
Privacy questions: privacy@continuo.co.za
Data Protection Officer: dpo@continuo.co.za
Continuo is operated by EchoPoint Systems (Pty) Ltd, registered in South Africa.